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Unconditionally Secure Key Distribution in Higher
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Abstract—This paper presents a prepare-and-measure scheme
using -dimensional quantum particles as information carriers
where is a prime power. One of the key ingredients used to
resist eavesdropping in this scheme is to depolarize all Pauli er-
rors introduced to the quantum information carriers. Using the
Shor–Preskill-type argument, we prove that this scheme is uncon-
ditionally secure against all attacks allowed by the laws of quantum
physics. For = 2 2, each information carrier can be
replaced by entangled qubits. In this case, there is a family of
eavesdropping attacks on which no unentangled-qubit-based pre-
pare-and-measure (PM) quantum key distribution scheme known
to date can generate a provably secure key. In contrast, under the
same family of attacks, our entangled-qubit-based scheme remains
secure whenever 2 4. This demonstrates the advantage of
using entangled particles as information carriers and of using de-
polarization of Pauli errors to combat eavesdropping attacks more
drastic than those that can be handled by unentangled-qubit-based
prepare-and-measure schemes.
Index Terms—Depolarization, entanglement purification, local
quantum operation, Pauli error, phase error correction, quantum
key distribution, Shor–Preskill proof, two-way classical communi-
cation, unconditional security.
I. INTRODUCTION
KEY distribution is the art of sharing a secret key betweentwo cooperative players Alice and Bob in the presence of
an eavesdropper Eve. If Alice and Bob distribute their key by ex-
changing classical messages only, Eve may at least in principle
wiretap their conversations without being caught. So, given un-
limited computational resources, Eve can crack the secret key. In
contrast, in any attempt to distinguish between two nonorthog-
onal states, information gain is only possible at the expense of
disturbing the state [1]. Therefore, if Alice and Bob distribute
their secret key by sending nonorthogonal quantum signals, any
eavesdropping attempt will almost surely affect their signal fi-
delity. Consequently, a carefully designed quantum key distri-
bution (QKD) scheme allows Alice and Bob to accurately de-
termine the quantum error rate, which in turn reflects the eaves-
dropping rate. If the estimated quantum error rate is too high,
Alice and Bob abort the scheme and start all over again. Other-
wise, they perform certain privacy amplification procedures to
distill out the final key [2]–[6]. It is, therefore, conceivable that
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a provably secure QKD scheme exists even when Eve has un-
limited computational power.
With this belief in mind, researchers proposed many QKD
schemes [6]. These schemes differ in many ways such as the
Hilbert space dimension of the quantum particles used, as well
as the states and bases Alice and Bob prepared and measured.
The first QKD scheme, commonly known as BB84, was in-
vented by Bennett and Brassard [7]. In BB84, Alice randomly
and independently prepares each qubit in one of the following
four states: , , and , and sends them to Bob.
After receiving the qubits, Bob randomly and independently
measures each qubit in either or
bases. In short, BB84 is an experimentally feasible prepare-
and-measure (PM) scheme involving the transfer of unentan-
gled qubits [7]. Later, Bruß introduced another experimentally
feasible PM scheme known as the six-state scheme [8]. In this
scheme, Alice randomly and independently prepares each qubit
in one of the following six states: , , , and
; and Bob measures each of them randomly and
independently in one of the following three bases: ,
, and . Although the six-state
scheme is more complex and generates a key less efficiently,
Bruß found that it tolerates higher noise level than BB84 if Eve
attacks each qubit individually [8]. In addition to qubit-based
schemes such as BB84 and the six-state scheme, a number of
PM QKD schemes involving higher dimensional or continuous
systems have been proposed [9]–[17]. Most importantly, com-
pared with qubit-based PM schemes, studies showed that many
PM schemes involving higher dimensional systems can generate
secure keys when a higher fraction of particles is eavesdropped
individually [13]–[16], [18].
Instead of using PM schemes, Alice and Bob may explicitly
use their shared entanglement to create a secret key. The first
such entanglement-based (EB) QKD scheme was proposed by
Ekert [19]. This scheme makes use of the fact that measuring a
singlet state along a common axis produces
a pair of anticorrelated random bits. Consequently, a common
key can be established provided that Alice and Bob share sin-
glets through a quantum communication channel. To ensure that
the fidelity of the shared singlets is high, Alice and Bob check if
certain Bell’s inequalities are maximally violated in a randomly
selected subset of their shared particles [19]. Comparing with
PM schemes, a typical EB scheme generates a key more effi-
ciently but is harder to implement experimentally.
Are these QKD schemes really secure? Is it true that the
six-state scheme tolerates higher error level than BB84? The an-
swers to these questions turn out to be highly nontrivial. Recall
that the all-powerful Eve may choose to attack the transmitted
0018-9448/$20.00 © 2005 IEEE
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qubits collectively by applying a unitary operator to entangle
these qubits with her quantum particles. In this situation, most
of our familiar tools such as classical probability theory do not
apply to the resultant highly entangled nonclassical state. These
make rigorous cryptanalysis of BB84, the six-state, and Ekert
schemes extremely difficult.
In spite of these difficulties, air-tight security proofs against
all possible eavesdropping attacks of BB84, the six-state, and
Ekert schemes have been discovered. Rigorous proofs of QKD
schemes with better error tolerance have also been found.
Mayers [4] and Biham et al. [20] eventually proved the security
of BB84 against all kinds of attacks allowed by the known laws
of quantum physics. In particular, Mayers showed that in BB84
a provably secure key can be generated whenever the bit-error
rate (BER) is less than about 7% [4]. (A precise definition of
BER can be found in Definition 3 in Section IV-A. Moreover,
we emphasize that, unless otherwise stated, all provably secure
error rates quoted in this paper are provable lower bounds.
A QKD scheme may generate a secure key at a higher error
rate although a rigorous proof has not been found.) Along
a different line, Lo and Chau [3] proved the security of an
EB QKD scheme, which is similar to the Ekert scheme, that
applies up to 1/3 BER by means of a random hashing technique
based on entanglement purification [21]. Their security proof is
conceptually simple and appealing. Nevertheless, their scheme
requires quantum computers and hence is not practical yet. By
ingeniously combining the essence of the Mayers and Lo–Chau
proofs, Shor and Preskill gave a security proof of BB84 that
applies up to 11.0% BER [22]. This is a marked improvement
over the 7% bit error tolerance rate in Mayers’ proof. Since
then, the Shor–Preskill proof became a blueprint for the crypt-
analysis of many QKD schemes. For instance, Lo [23] as well
as Gottesman and Lo [24] extended it to cover the six-state
QKD scheme. At the same time, the work of Gottesman and Lo
also demonstrates that careful use of local quantum operation
plus two-way classical communication (LOCC2) increases
the error tolerance rate of QKD. Furthermore, they found
that the six-state scheme tolerates a higher BER than BB84
because the six-state scheme gives better estimates for the three
Pauli error rates [24]. In search of an unentangled-qubit-based
(UQB) QKD scheme that tolerates higher BER, Chau recently
discovered an adaptive entanglement purification procedure
inspired by the technique used by Gottesman and Lo in [24].
He further gave a Shor–Preskill-based proof showing that
this adaptive entanglement purification procedure allows the
six-state scheme to generate a provably secure key up to a BER
of [25], making it the most error-tolerant
PM scheme involving the transfer of unentangled qubits to date.
Unlike various UQB QKD schemes, very little cryptanal-
ysis against the most general type of eavesdropping attack on
a QKD scheme involving the transfer of higher dimensional
quantum systems or entangled qubits has been performed. The
only relevant work to date seems to be the earlier version of this
work [17]. In that manuscript, an unconditionally secure QKD
scheme that generalized the six-state scheme by using conjuga-
tion to cyclically permute kinds of quantum errors that
can occur in the -dimensional quantum information carriers
was reported. Moreover, the set of preparation and measurement
bases used is mutually unbiased [17]. Probably because Pauli
errors are not depolarized when , the error tolerance ca-
pability of that scheme is not particularly high under the most
general type of attack when . More importantly,
that scheme does not conclusively demonstrate the superiority
of using entangled qubits to combat Eve [17]. In contrast, almost
all cryptanalysis suggests that QKD schemes involving higher
dimensional systems are more error tolerant under individual
particle attack [13]–[15], [18]. It is, therefore, instructive to find
an unconditionally secure PM QKD scheme based on entangled
qubits that stands up to more drastic eavesdropping attacks than
all known UQB PM schemes known to date.
In this paper, we analyze the security and error tolerance ca-
pability of a PM QKD scheme involving the transmission of
higher dimensional quantum particles or entangled qubits. In
fact, this scheme makes use of -dimensional quantum infor-
mation carriers prepared and measured randomly in
different bases. (In the cases of the number
of bases used can be reduced to .) Such a preparation
and measurement procedure depolarizes all Pauli errors in the
transmitted signal. This greatly restricts the form of errors oc-
curring in the quantum signals and makes error estimation ef-
fective; hence, its error tolerance rate is high. Nonetheless, the
high error tolerance rate comes with a price, namely, that the ef-
ficiency of the scheme drops.
This paper is organized as follows. We first review the general
assumptions on the capabilities of Alice, Bob, and Eve, as well
as a precisely stated security requirement for a general QKD
scheme in Section II. Then we introduce an EB QKD scheme
involving the transmission of -dimensional quantum systems,
where is a prime power in Section III and prove its security
against the most general eavesdropping attack in Section IV. By
standard Shor and Preskill reduction argument, we arrive at the
provably secure PM scheme using unentangled -dimensional
quantum particles in Section V. Since one may use possibly
entangled qubits to represent an -dimensional quantum state
whenever , we obtain an unconditionally secure entan-
gled-qubit-based (EQB) PM QKD scheme. (See Section V for a
discussion of a subtle point in constructing this EQB PM QKD
scheme. Moreover, we emphasize that the term EQB means that
the qubits used to transfer information between Alice and Bob
are entangled. In contrast, the term EB means that entanglement
shared between Alice and Bob is explicitly used to generate the
secret key. Thus, an EQB scheme may not be an EB scheme.)
This EQB PM QKD scheme offers a definite advantage over all
currently known UQB ones used to combat Eve. Specifically,
whenever the most error-tolerant UQB PM QKD scheme known
to date (namely, the one introduced by Chau in [25]) can gen-
erate a provably secure key under an eavesdropping attack, this
EQB scheme can also generate an equally secure key for any
under the same attack. Furthermore, there is a family of
eavesdropping attacks that creates a BER too high for Chau’s
scheme in [25] to generate a provably secure key. In contrast, the
same family of attacks does not prevent this EQB PM scheme
from producing a secure key whenever . This observation
convincingly demonstrates that using entangled particles as in-
formation carriers can increase error tolerance in QKD. Finally,
we give a brief summary in Section VI.
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II. GENERAL FEATURES AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR
QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION
In QKD, we assume that Alice and Bob have access to two
communication channels. The first one is an insecure noisy
quantum channel. The other one is an unjammable noiseless
authenticated classical channel in which everyone, including
Eve, can listen to, but cannot alter, the content passing through
it. We also assume that Alice and Bob have complete control
over their own apparatus. Everything else for the unjammable
classical channel may be manipulated by the all-powerful Eve.
We further make the most pessimistic assumption that Eve is
capable of performing any operation in her controlled territory
that is allowed by the known laws of quantum physics [5], [6].
Given an unjammable classical channel and an insecure
quantum channel, a QKD scheme consists of three stages [2].
The first is the signal preparation and transmission stage in
which quantum signals are prepared and exchanged between
Alice and Bob. The second is the signal quality test stage in
which a subset of the exchanged quantum signals is measured
in order to estimate the eavesdropping rate in the quantum
channel. The final phase is the signal privacy amplification
stage in which a carefully designed privacy amplification
procedure is performed to distill out an almost perfectly secure
key.
No QKD scheme can be 100% secure as Eve may be lucky
enough to guess the preparation or measurement bases for each
quantum state correctly. Hence, it is more reasonable to demand
that the mutual information between Eve’s measurement results
after eavesdropping and the final secret key is less than an arbi-
trary but fixed small positive number. Hence we adopt the fol-
lowing definition of security.
Definition 1 (Based on Lo and Chau [3]) : With the above
assumptions on the unlimited computational power of Eve, a
QKD scheme is said to be unconditionally secure with security
parameters provided that whenever Eve has a cheating
strategy that passes the signal quality control test with proba-
bility greater than , the mutual information between Eve’s
measurement results from eavesdropping and the final secret
key is less than .
III. AN ENTANGLEMENT-BASED QKD SCHEME
In this section, we generalize the six-state scheme in a
new way. In Section III-A, we first identify each element in
, the special linear group of matrices over the
finite field GF , with a distinct unitary operator in .
It turns out that all Pauli errors occurring in the transmitted
particles can be depolarized by conjugating each transmitted
particle by a randomly and independently picked unitary oper-
ator to be constructed. Then, in Section III-B, we devise an EB
QKD scheme based on this set of unitary operators.
A. Construction of the Unitary Operator
We begin with the following definitions.
Definition 2 (Ashikhmin and Knill [26]) : Let GF
where with being a prime. We define the unitary
operators and acting on an -dimensional Hilbert space
by
(1)
and
(2)
where is an additive character of the finite field GF ,
is a primitive th root of unity, and
is the absolute trace of GF . Note that the arithmetic
inside the state ket and in the exponent of is performed in
the finite field GF .
It is easy to see from Definition 2 that the set of all Pauli errors
acting on an -dimensional particle GF
spans the set of all possible linear operators acting on that par-
ticle over . (Unless otherwise stated, all linear operators dis-
cussed in this paper are endomorphisms.) Besides, and
follow the algebra
(3)
(4)
and
(5)
for all GF , where arithmetic in the subscripts is per-
formed in GF .
One way to permute quantum errors is to construct a unitary
operator that maps to modulo a phase
factor by conjugation. Specifically, let
where is a prime power. We look for a unitary operator
satisfying
(6)
for all GF , where the arithmetic in the subscripts
is performed in GF and the factor satisfies
. When the matrix is clearly
known to the readers, we shall simply denote by and
by .
The choice of is not unique if it exists. This is because
also permutes quantum errors modulo a phase factor
for all and GF . (However, the phase
depends on the values and .)
An invertible satisfying (6) does not exist in general. To see
this, we use (3)–(6) to manipulate the expression .
On the one hand
On the other hand,
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Thus, the above two ways of expressing agree for
all GF is a necessary condition for the existence
of ; otherwise, is not injective as it maps a nonzero vector
to the zero vector.
It is tedious but straightforward to check that the phase factor
given in (7), together with the three phase conventions shown
later in (8)–(10) satisfy the necessary condition for the existence
of stated in the above paragraph. More importantly, we
prove in Theorem 1 that the phase factor defined in
this way makes invertible for all . We
begin by writing down this particular phase factor as
follows:
(7)
for all GF . Note that in (7),
and
where is a fixed basis of GF over the field
GF and GF . Moreover, if and
if in the above equation is the Kronecker delta.
The phase conventions are chosen as follows. When
and hence is odd, is invertible in GF . Consequently,
the phase may be chosen from th roots of unity. Fol-
lowing this convention requires
for any GF if (8)
In contrast, when and hence is even, is not invertible
in GF . Consequently, may be integral or half-in-
tegral; and . In this case, we use the con-
vention
if
if (9)
and
if
if (10)
for all GF , where .
We explain why the last term in (7) is required. Recall that
the identity
holds only for . In contrast
for . So, we cannot use the first identity to absorb the last
term in (7) into the first term when .
Lemma 1: Suppose is a nonzero linear operator
obeying (7)–(10) as well as the equation
for all GF . Then is invertible. Besides,
is unitary after a proper scaling. Specifically, is unitary
if and only if its operator norm satisfies .
Proof: Clearly, also satisfies the equation
From (7)–(10), we know that
for all GF . By the same argument
for all GF . Thus, and are
nonzero operators belonging to the centralizer of
. In other words, and
are nonzero constant multiples of the identity operator. Hence,
is invertible. Obviously, the invertible operator is unitary
if and only if .
Theorem 1: Let be a fixed basis of GF
over GF . For any
the unitary operator satisfying (6)–(10) exists. A possible
choice of is
(11)
for some , with being the span of
the columns of . In the above equation, the functions
GF GF GF are given by
(12)
and
(13)
respectively. In (12) and (13), GF and
GF are the solutions of the system of
equations
(14)
(15)
and
(16)
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TABLE I
THE OPERATOR T FOR A FEW M ’S IN THE CASE OF N = 2; 3; AND 4. NOTE
THAT ! 2 GF (4) IN THE LAST ROW OF THE TABLE SATISFIES ! +!+1 = 0
Proof: We show the existence of by explicitly con-
structing it. We write
for some . Substituting this into (6) and equating the
coefficient of , we obtain
(17)
for all GF . Using (7)–(10), it is tedious but
straightforward to check that (17) consists of , ,
and independent equations when is of rank
and respectively.
In what follows, we only consider the case
. The other cases can be proven in a similar manner. Since
is invertible, . Besides,
the solution of
GF and GF
in the system of (14)–(16) exists and is unique for any given
GF . Hence, by choosing these
, we may use the independent
equations taken from (17) to relate every to for all
. In this way, we conclude that every is
proportional to . Besides, all ’s are equal. Conse-
quently, from Lemma 1, the unitarity of implies that
. Substituting into (6)–(10) and
(17), we arrive at (11)–(13).
For the purpose of illustration, the unitary operators ’s
for a few ’s computed by (8)–(13) are listed in Table I. Inci-
dentally, the unitary operator listed in Table I for
is, up to a global phase, the same as the one used by Lo in his
security proof of the six-state scheme in [23]. Furthermore, it is
shown in Theorem 8 in the Appendix that the first three opera-
tors listed in Table I are of great importance in the construction
of QKD schemes for .
The unitary operator stated in Theorem 1 depends on
the matrix . So we may regard as a map from
to . Let
for . Suppose further that is odd. From (7), it follows
that
for all GF . In other words
Hence, the map defines a faithful
transposed representation of for all odd . As
is generated by two elements for any prime power
[27], Alice and Bob may apply any if they can
apply the two specific unitary operators corresponding to the
generators of . In contrast, when is even, is
not a group representation of . Fortunately, readers
will find out in Section III that the security of all the QKD
schemes reported in this paper do not depend on the phase
. Therefore, in practice, Alice and Bob may replace
used in the QKD schemes reported in this
paper by in which ’s are chosen
from the two generators of . (Note that the unitary
operator defined in this way may depend on the decomposition
of a matrix in into factors of ’s. However, the
unitary operator defined by any such decomposition will work
equally well.)
B. An Entanglement-Based QKD Scheme
EB QKD Scheme A
1) Let the Hilbert space dimension of each quantum
particle involved in this scheme be a prime power. Alice
prepares quantum particle pairs in the state
. She randomly and independently
applies a unitary transformation
to the second particle in each pair. She keeps the first
particle and sends the second in each pair to Bob. Bob ac-
knowledges the receipt of these particles and then applies
a randomly and independently picked to each
received particle. Now, Alice and Bob publicly reveal
their unitary transformations applied to each particle. A
shared pair is then kept and is said to be in the set
if Alice and Bob have applied and to
the second particle of the shared pair, respectively. Thus,
in the absence of noise and Eve, each pair of shared
particles kept by Alice and Bob should be in the state
.
2) Alice and Bob estimate the channel error rate by sacri-
ficing a few particle pairs. Specifically, they randomly
pick pairs from
each of the sets and measure each par-
ticle of the pair in the GF basis, namely,
the standard basis. They publicly announce and compare
their measurement results. In this way, they know the es-
timated channel error rate to within with probability at
least . (A detailed proof of this claim can be found
in [2]. A brief outline of the proof will also be given in
Section IV-B for handy reference.) If the channel error
rate is too high, they abort the scheme and start all over
again.
3) Alice and Bob perform the following privacy amplifica-
tion procedure. (It will be shown in Section IV that step
3a below reduces errors of the form with
at the expense of increasing errors of the form with
. In contrast, step 3b below reduces errors of the
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form with at the expense of increasing errors
of the form with . Applying steps 3a and 3b in
turn is an effective way to reduce all kinds of quantum er-
rors provided that the error rate is not too high.)
a) Alice and Bob apply the entanglement purification pro-
cedure by two-way classical communication (LOCC2
EP) similar to the one reported in [21], [28]. Specifi-
cally, Alice and Bob randomly group their remaining
quantum particles in tetrads where each tetrad consists
of two pairs shared by Alice and Bob in step 1. Alice
randomly picks one of the two particles in her share of
each tetrad as the control register and the other as the
target. She applies the following unitary operation to
the control and target registers:
(18)
where the subtraction is performed in the finite field
GF . Bob applies the same unitary transformation
to his corresponding share of particles in the tetrad.
Then, they publicly announce the measurement results
of their target registers in the standard basis. They keep
their control registers only when the measurement re-
sults of their corresponding target registers agree. They
repeat the above LOCC2 EP procedure until there is
an integer such that a single application of step
3b will bring the signal quantum error rate of the re-
sultant particles down to less than for an arbi-
trary but fixed security parameter , where
is the number of remaining pairs they share currently.
They abort the scheme either when is greater than
the number of remaining quantum pairs they possess
or when they have used up all their quantum particles
in this procedure.
b) They apply the majority vote phase error correction
(PEC) procedure introduced by Gottesman and Lo
[24]. Specifically, Alice and Bob randomly divide the
resultant particles into sets each containing pairs
of particles shared by Alice and Bob. Alice and Bob
jointly apply the phase error correction
procedure to their corresponding shares of parti-
cles in each set and retain their phase error corrected
quantum particles. At this point, Alice and Bob should
share almost perfect pairs with
fidelity at least . By measuring their shared
pairs in the standard basis, Alice and Bob obtain their
common key. More importantly, Eve’s information on
this common key is less than the security parameter
. (Proof of this claim can be found in Theorem 3 in
Section IV-C below.)
One may simplify Scheme A by picking ’s from ,
where is a proper subgroup of whose number of
elements divides . Theorem 8 in the Appendix tells us
that the subgroup exists if and only if and
. From now on, we use the symbol to denote
either the entire group or the order subgroup
of .
In the case and equals the cyclic group of three
elements, Scheme A is a variation of the six-state scheme in-
troduced by Chau in [25]. The key difference is that, unlike the
former one, the present scheme does not make use of the Calder-
bank–Shor–Steane quantum code after PEC.
Lemma 3 in Section IV-C shows that all Pauli errors in the
quantum signal right after step 1 in Scheme A are depolarized.
Furthermore, Theorem 8 in the Appendix shows that the same
conclusion applies when Alice and Bob pick from a subgroup
of of order .
IV. CRYPTANALYSIS OF THE ENTANGLEMENT-BASED
QKD SCHEME
In this section, we present a detailed unconditional security
proof of Scheme A in the limit of a large number of quantum par-
ticles transmitted. We also investigate the maximum error tol-
erance rate of Scheme A against the most general type of eaves-
dropping attack allowed by the laws of quantum physics. With
suitable modifications, the security proof reported here can be
extended to the case of a small finite . Nevertheless, working
in the limit of large makes the asymptotic error tolerance rate
analysis easier.
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion IV-A, we define various error rate measures and discuss
how to fairly compare error tolerance capabilities between dif-
ferent QKD schemes. Then, in Section IV-B, we briefly explain
why a reliable upper bound of the channel error can be obtained
by randomly testing only a small subset of quantum particles in
step 2 of Scheme A. Finally, in Section IV-C, we prove the secu-
rity of the privacy amplification procedure in step 3 of Scheme
A and analyze its error tolerance rate. This will complete the
proof of unconditional security for EB Scheme A.
A. Fair Comparison of Error Tolerance Capability and
Various Measures of Error Rates
Definition 3: Recall that Alice prepares particle pairs each
in the state and randomly applies
to the second particle in each pair. We denote the resul-
tant (pure) state of the pairs by . Then, she sends
one particle in each pair through an insecure quantum channel
to Bob; and upon receipt, Bob randomly applies to
his share of the pair. The channel quantum error rate in this
situation is defined as the marginal error rate of the measure-
ment results if Alice and Bob were to make a hypothetical mea-
surement on the th shared quantum particle pair in the basis
GF for all . In other words, the
channel quantum error rate equals times the expectation
value of the cardinality of the set
hypothetical measurement of the th pair equals
with
The channel standard basis measurement error rate is de-
fined as times the expectation value of the cardinality of
the set
hypothetical measurement of the th pair equals
with
The next two definitions concern only those quantum particle
pairs retained by Alice and Bob in . (That is, those
that Alice and Bob have applied and to the
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second particle of the shared pair for some , respec-
tively.) In the absence of noise and Eve, all such particle pairs
should be in the state . The signal quantum
error rate (or quantum error rate (QER) for short) in this situ-
ation is defined as the expectation value of the proportion of
particle pairs in whose measurement result in the basis
GF
equals for some .
The signal standard basis measurement error rate (or stan-
dard basis measurement error rate (SBMER) for short) is de-
fined as the expectation value of the proportion of particle pairs
in whose measurement result in the basis
GF
equals
for some . In other words, SBMER measures the apparent
error rate of the signal when Alice and Bob measure their re-
spective shares of particles in the standard basis. In the special
case of , any standard basis measurement result can be
bijectively mapped to an -bit string. Thus, it makes sense to
define the signal bit-error rate (or BER for short) as the mar-
ginal error rate of the -bit string resulting from a standard basis
measurement of the signal at the end of the signal preparation
and transmission stage.
Three important remarks are in place. First, SBMERs and
BERs of QKD schemes using quantum particles of different
dimensions as information carriers should never be compared
directly. This is because the quantum communication channels
used are different. In addition, the same eavesdropping strategy
may lead to different error rates [13]–[16], [18]. It appears that
the only sensible situation in which it is meaningful to compare
the error tolerance capabilities of two QKD schemes is when the
schemes are using the same quantum communication channel
and are subjected to the same eavesdropping attack. Specifi-
cally, let Alice reversibly map every -dimensional quantum
state used in Scheme A into possibly entangled -dimensional
quantum particles and send them through an insecure -dimen-
sional quantum particle communication channel to Bob. More-
over, since we assume that Alice and Bob do not have quantum
storage capability, it is reasonable to require that Alice pre-
pares and sends packets of possibly entangled -dimensional
quantum particles one after another. In this way, Scheme A be-
comes an entangled-particle-based QKD scheme. More impor-
tantly, Eve may apply the same eavesdropping attack on the in-
secure -dimensional quantum particle channel used by Alice
and Bob irrespective of the value . Thus, it is fair to com-
pare the error tolerance capability between two entangled-par-
ticle-based QKD schemes derived from Scheme A using - and
-dimensional particles, respectively, against any eavesdrop-
ping attack on the -dimensional quantum particle channel.
Second, the BER defined above for with
depends on the bijection used. Fortunately, in Section IV-C,
readers will find that the BER for the QKD scheme reported
in this paper is independent of this bijection.
Third, Lemma 3 in Section IV-C and Theorem 8 in the Ap-
pendix show that Pauli errors that occurred in a collection of
-dimensional quantum registers are depolarized if we con-
jugate each register by a randomly and independently picked
. Furthermore, the channel QER is equal to the
QER of the signal. Roughly speaking, QER refers to the rate of
any quantum error (phase shift and/or spin flip) occurring in the
pair shared by Alice and Bob. In contrast,
the depolarization of Pauli errors implies that the channel stan-
dard basis measurement error rate does not equal the SBMER
in general.
B. Reliability of the Error Rate Estimation
In Scheme A, Alice and Bob keep only those particle pairs
that are believed to be in the state at the
end of step 1. Then, they measure some of them in the stan-
dard basis in the signal quality control test in step 2. More im-
portantly, since all the LOCC2 EP and PEC privacy amplifica-
tion procedures in step 3 map standard basis to standard basis,
we can imagine that the final standard basis measurements of
their shared secret key were performed right at the beginning of
step 3. In this way, any quantum eavesdropping strategy used by
Eve is reduced to a classical probabilistic cheating strategy. In
other words, for any quantum eavesdropping strategy, one can
always find an equivalent Pauli attack that has the same proba-
bility of passing the signal quality control test in step 2 and gives
the same density matrix of the shared quantum particles just be-
fore the final standard basis measurement in step 3. Therefore,
we need only to consider Pauli attack in the subsequent anal-
ysis [3].
Recall that in step 2, Alice and Bob do not care about the
measurement result of an individual quantum register; they only
care about the difference between the measurement outcome of
Alice and the corresponding outcome of Bob. In other words,
they apply the projection operator
(19)
to each of the randomly selected quantum registers in the set
. The projection operator can be rewritten in a
form involving Bell-like states as follows. Define to be
the Bell-like state
Then, can be rewritten as
(20)
Since every particle pair in is subjected to and
before and after passing through the insecure channel,
respectively, is a measure of whether an error of the form
for some GF has occurred in this
pair. Recall that is randomly and independently chosen
for each pair. Moreover, such a choice is known to Eve after the
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second half of the particle pair has reached Bob. So, combined
with (6) as well as (19) and (20), the signal quality control test
in step 2 of Scheme A can be regarded as an effective random
sampling test for the fidelity of the pairs as
At this point, classical sampling theory can be used to esti-
mate the quantum channel error and hence the eavesdropping
rate of the classical probabilistic cheating strategy used by Eve,
as well as the fidelity of the remaining pairs as .
Lemma 2 (Adapted From Lo, Chau, and Ardehali [2]): Sup-
pose that immediately after step 1 in Scheme A, Alice and Bob
share pairs of particles in the set , namely, those parti-
cles that were conjugated by . Suppose further that Alice
and Bob randomly pick of the
pairs for testing in step 2. Define the estimated channel standard
basis measurement error rate to be the portion of tested pairs
whose measurement results obtained by Alice and Bob differ.
Denote the channel standard basis measurement error rate for
the set by . Then, the probability that is
of the order of for any fixed .
Proof: Using earlier discussions in this subsection, the
problem depicted in this lemma is equivalent to a classical
random sampling problem without replacement whose solution
follows directly from [2, Lemma 1].
Lemma 2 assures that by randomly choosing
out of pairs to test, the unbiased estimator cannot differ
significantly from the actual channel standard basis measure-
ment error rate . More importantly, the number of particle
pairs they need to test is independent of . Therefore, in the
limit of large (and hence large ), randomly testing a neg-
ligibly small portion of quantum particle pairs is sufficient for
Alice and Bob to estimate the channel standard basis measure-
ment error rate in the set with high confidence [2]. In ad-
dition, the QER of the remaining untested particle pairs is the
same as that of in the large limit.
Theorem 2: Let denote the group or its order
subgroup reported in Theorem 8. Using the nota-
tion in Lemma 2, is a reliable estimator of the
upper bound of the QER, where denotes the mean averaged
over all . Specifically, the probability that the QER ex-
ceeds is less than .
Proof: Recall that Eve does not know the choice of uni-
tary operators applied by Alice and Bob in step 1 in Scheme A.
Consequently, by Lemma 3 in Section IV-C or Theorem 8 in the
Appendix , step 1 in Scheme A depolarizes Pauli errors of the
quantum particles. That is, in the limit of a large , the
error rate in the set is equal to that of
in the set for all . Among the
errors occurring in the set , only those with can be
recorded in step 2. Thus, the estimator for the QER equals
This theorem now follows directly from Lemma 2.
To summarize, once the signal quality control test in step 2
of Scheme A is passed, Alice and Bob have high confidence (of
at least ) that the QER of the remaining untested particle
pairs is small enough for the signal privacy amplification stage
in step 3 to handle. Moreover, the estimation given in Theorem 2
is independent of the phase used by the unitary oper-
ator .
Before closing this subsection, we would like to point out that
one can estimate the QER in a more aggressive way. Specifi-
cally, Alice and Bob do not only know whether the measurement
results of each tested pair are equal, in fact they also know the
difference between their measurement results in each tested pair.
They may exploit this extra piece of information to better esti-
mate the probability of error in the signal for each
GF . Such estimation helps them to devise tailor-made pri-
vacy amplification schemes that tackle the specific kind of error
caused by channel noise and Eve. While this methodology will
be useful in practical QKD, we shall not pursue this further here
as the aim of this paper is the worst case cryptanalysis in the
limit of a large number of quantum particle transfers .
C. Security of Privacy Amplification
Definition 4: We denote the error rate of the quantum
particles shared by Alice and Bob just before step 3 in Scheme
A by . When there is no possible confusion in the subscript,
we shall write instead of . Similarly, we denote the
error rate of the resultant quantum particles shared by them after
rounds of LOCC2 EP by or . Suppose further that
Alice and Bob perform PEC using the majority vote
code after rounds of LOCC2 EP. We denote the resultant
error rate by or .
Lemma 3: Let . The signal quantum error suf-
fered by quantum particle pairs in can be regarded
as depolarized. In other words, the QER satisfies
(21)
and
for all (22)
Proof: Recall that Alice and Bob randomly and indepen-
dently apply and to each transmitted quantum
register. More importantly, their choices are unknown to Eve
when the quantum particle is traveling in the insecure channel.
Let be the quantum operation that Eve applies to the quantum
particles in the set . (In other words, is a
completely positive convex-linear map acting on the set of den-
sity matrices describing the quantum particle pairs to which
Alice and Bob have applied and , respectively,
for some . Moreover, for
any density matrix .) After Alice and Bob have publicly an-
nounced their choices of quantum operations, every quantum
particle pair in has an equal chance of having expe-
rienced where .
Note that the index in the tensor product in the above expres-
sion runs over all particle pairs in . From the discussions
in Section IV-B, we know that Eve’s attack may be reduced to a
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classical probabilistic one. In other words, we may regard as
a Pauli error operator. Since is a group and the set
contains elements for all , we conclude
from (6) that the Pauli quantum error of the quantum particles
in the set is depolarized. Hence, (21) and (22)
apply.
After establishing the initial conditions for the QER, we in-
vestigate the effect of LOCC2 EP on the QER.
Lemma 4: In the limit of a large number of transmitted
quantum registers, is given by
(23)
In particular, if ’s are given by (21) and (22), then
(24)
(25)
for all and
(26)
for all GF with .
Proof: Suppose that Bob’s control and target registers
experience and errors, respectively. (In contrast,
those retained by Alice are error free as they never passed
through the insecure noisy channel.) After applying the unitary
operation in (18), the errors in the control and target registers
become and , respectively.
Recall that the privacy amplification procedure in step 3 is
performed irrespective of which set the particle belongs to.
So, in the limit of a large number of transmitted quantum reg-
isters, the covariance between probabilities of picking any two
distinct quantum registers tends to zero. Likewise, the covari-
ance between probabilities of picking any two distinct pairs of
quantum registers also tends to zero. Hence, in this limit, the
expectation value of the error rate just after applying the
unitary operation in (18) can be computed by assuming that the
error in every pair of control and target registers is independent.
Moreover, the variance of the error rate tends to zero in
this limit.
To show that (23) is valid, let us recall that Alice and Bob
keep their control registers only when the measurement results
of their corresponding target registers agree. In other words,
they keep a control register only when . Thus, once the
control register in Bob’s laboratory is kept, it will suffer an error
where and . Therefore, in the limit of
a large number of transmitted quantum registers, the number of
quantum registers remaining after rounds of LOCC2 EP
is proportional to
Similarly, the number of quantum registers suffering from
errors after rounds of LOCC2 EP is proportional to
Furthermore, the two proportionality constants are the same.
Therefore,
(27)
for all . Equation (23) can then be proven by mathematical
induction on . (It is easier to use mathematical induction to
prove the validity of the numerator in (23) and then use (21) to
determine the denominator.)
In particular, if the initial error rates ’s are given by (21)
and (22), then (24)–(26) can be proven by mathematical induc-
tion on with the help of (27).
Lemma 4 generalizes a similar result for qubits [24], [25].
In fact, the effect of LOCC2 EP is to reduce errors of the form
with at the expense of possibly increasing errors of
the form with . We further remark that in the case where
is finite, is determined by solving the classical problem
of randomly pairing kinds of balls in an urn containing
balls. Therefore, is related to the so-called multivariate hy-
pergeometric distribution whose theory is reviewed extensively
in [29].
Lemma 5: In the limit of a large number of quantum particles
transmitted from Alice to Bob, the error rate after PEC
using majority vote code satisfies
(28)
Moreover, if ’s satisfy (21), (22), and , then
(29)
as . This inequality also holds if depends on .
Proof: Recall that the parity-check matrix of the
majority vote code is
.
.
.
.
.
.
(30)
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Therefore, after measuring the (phase) error syndrome, the
error stays with the control register whereas the error prop-
agates from the control as well as all target registers to the re-
sultant control quantum register [30]. Specifically, let the error
in the th quantum register be for . Then,
after measuring the error syndrome, the resultant error in the re-
maining control register equals . Consequently,
after PEC, the error in the remaining register is
where is the majority of . In other words,
after PEC, spin flip error rates are increased by at most times.
Hence, (28) holds.
By the same argument used in Lemma 4, in the limit of a large
number of transferred quantum registers, the rate of any kind of
phase error after PEC, , satisfies
the number of registers
suffering from error of the form
is greater than or equal to those suffering
from error of the form when drawn
from a random sample of registers,
given a fixed (31)
where the maximum is taken over all possible probabilities with
different ’s satisfying the constraints in (21) and (22). We
denote the sum by . Then
the number of
registers suffering from error of the form
is greater than or equal to those
suffering from error of the form
when drawn from a random sample of
registers, given that these registers
are suffering from error of the
form for for a fixed
(32)
where as . Note that we have used [31, eq.
(1.2.5)] to arrive at the second inequality above. (That equation
is applicable because the assumption that leads to
for a sufficiently large .) It is straightforward to
check that (32) remains valid if depends on .
Since
is the dominant term in the common denominator of (24)–(26)
when is sufficiently large, (29) follows directly from (24)–(26)
and (32).
The preceding theorem tells us that the effect of PEC is to
reduce errors of the form with at the expense of
possibly increasing errors of the form with . For this
reason, powerful signal privacy amplification procedures can be
constructed by suitably combining LOCC2 EP and PEC.
Now, we prove the unconditional security of Scheme A.
Theorem 3: Let be a prime power, and let , , and
be three arbitrarily small but fixed positive numbers. Define
(33)
The EB QKD Scheme A involving the transfer of -dimen-
sional quantum particles is unconditionally secure with security
parameters when the number of quantum register trans-
fers is sufficiently large. Specifically, provided
that Alice and Bob abort the scheme whenever the estimated
QER in step 2 is greater than , the secret key gener-
ated by Alice and Bob is provably secure in the limit.
In fact, if Eve uses an eavesdropping strategy with at least
chance of passing the signal quality test stage in step 2, the
mutual information between Eve’s measurement results after
eavesdropping and the final secret key is less than . In this re-
spect, Scheme A tolerates asymptotically up to a QER of .
Proof: By picking
and applying Lemma 2 and Theorem 2, we conclude that by
testing pairs in each set , any
eavesdropping strategy that causes a QER higher than has
less than chance of passing the signal quality test stage in step
2 of Scheme A. (Similarly, if the QER is less than , it
has at least chance of passing step 2. As can be chosen
to be arbitrarily small, the signal quality test stage in step 2 of
Scheme A is not overly conservative.)
Now, suppose that Alice and Bob arrive at the signal privacy
amplification stage in step 3 of Scheme A. Since , the
quantum particle pairs used in the signal quality test stage in step
2 do not affect the error rates ’s of the remaining untested
particle pairs.
From the discussions in Section IV-B, we only need to
consider the case when Eve uses a classical cheating strategy.
Hence, the initial error rates ’s satisfy (21) and (22). After
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applying rounds of LOCC2 EP, Alice and Bob may consider
picking used in the majority vote PEC to be
(34)
where is the number of quantum particle pairs Alice and Bob
share immediately after the PEC procedure in step 3b. Provided
that , in the limit, . So, from (28) and
(29) in Lemma 5, the QER of the remaining quantum registers
after PEC, , is upper-bounded by
(35)
In other words, provided that
(36)
This condition is satisfied if and only if
(37)
It is easy to verify that the constraint in (37) is consistent with
the assumption that . Hence, provided that the initial
QER satisfies
(38)
the fidelity of the quantum particle pairs shared between Alice
and Bob immediately before they perform standard basis mea-
surements to obtain their secret key is at least
. By [3, Footnote 28], the mutual information between
Eve’s final measurement result after eavesdropping and the final
secret key is at most . Thus, provided Alice and Bob abort the
scheme if the estimated QER in step 2 exceeds , the
secret key generated is provably secure. That is, the scheme is
unconditionally secure with security parameters .
A few remarks are in order.
First, as Scheme A reduces any kind of eavesdropping attacks
in the channel to a classical cheating strategy which in turn is
reduced to depolarization of the quantum signal, the ratio of the
QER to the SBMER is given by . From Theorem
3, the maximum tolerable SBMER for Scheme A equals
(39)
In addition, if , Lemma 3 implies that no matter what
bijective map Alice and Bob use to convert their standard basis
TABLE II
THE TOLERABLE SBMER AND BER FOR SCHEME A AND HENCE ALSO
SCHEMES B AND C FOR N  16. AS POINTED OUT IN THE TEXT, THE VALUES
OF SBMER AND BER SHOULD NOT BE COMPARED DIRECTLY
-dimensional quantum particle measurement results into an
-bit string,the probability that exactly out of consecutive
measured bits are in error equals for all .
Consequently, the BER equals
and the maximum tolerable BER for Scheme A is given by
(40)
We tabulate the tolerable SBMER and BER in Table II. How-
ever, we must emphasize once again that according to the dis-
cussions in Section IV-A, we cannot deduce the relative error
tolerance capability from Table II.
Second, we study the tolerable error rate of Scheme A as
a function of . Table II shows that the maximum tolerable
BER for is the same as the one obtained ear-
lier by Chau in [25]. Additionally, increases as in-
creases. In fact, the tolerable SBMER and BER tend to 100%
and 50%, respectively, as . More precisely, as ,
the tolerable BER for Scheme A using -level quantum parti-
cles scales as . If is a prime power,
for Scheme A using -level quantum particles scales
as as . On the other hand, the
following lemma sets the upper limit for the tolerable SBMER
for Scheme A.
Lemma 6: The tolerable SBMER for Scheme A is upper-
bounded by . In fact, this bound is set by the fol-
lowing interpret-and-resend strategy: for each -dimensional
particle in the insecure quantum channel, Eve randomly and in-
dependently picks and measures the particle in
the basis GF . Then, she records the mea-
surement result and resends the measured particle to Bob.
Proof: The proof follows the idea reported in [24].
Clearly, using this intercept-and-resend strategy, no quantum
correlation between Alice and Bob can survive and hence no
provably secure key can be distributed. Thus, this eavesdrop-
ping strategy sets the upper bound for the tolerable SMBER
and BER for Scheme A. If the quantum particle is prepared by
Alice and measured by Eve in the same basis, that particle will
suffer error with equal probability for all GF . As
Scheme A depolarizes Pauli errors, we know that induced
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by this eavesdropping strategy equals . Therefore, the
SBMER for this strategy is
Thus, the difference between the tolerable SBMER and its
theoretical upper bound tends to zero in the limit of large .
So in this limit, the error tolerance capability of Scheme A ap-
proaches its maximally allowable value.
Third, readers may wonder why Scheme A is highly error
tolerant especially when is large. Every quantum cheating
strategy can be reduced to a classical one. Furthermore, Lemma
3 tells us that Scheme A depolarizes the errors caused by any
classical cheating strategy in the transmitted quantum signals.
This greatly restricts the types of quantum errors we need to
consider. The LOCC2 EP becomes a powerful tool to reduce
spin errors at the expense of increasing phase errors. Further-
more, for all provided that .
In other words, the dominant kind of phase error is having no
phase error at all. Thus, the majority vote PEC procedure is ef-
fective in bringing down the phase error. This is the underlying
reason why Scheme A is so powerful that, in the limit ,
.
Fourth, the unconditional security proof in Theorem 3 does
not depend on the phase used in (6). Recall from the
discussions in Section III-A that
is not a group representation. So, in practice, Alice and
Bob may replace used in Scheme A by
, in which the ’s are chosen
from the two generators of .
Fifth, the privacy amplification performed in Scheme A is
based entirely on entanglement purification and phase error cor-
rection. In fact, the key ingredient in reducing the QER used in
the proof of Theorem 3 is the validity of the condition stated
in (36). Nonetheless, there is no need to bring down the QER
to the small security parameter . One may devise an equally
secure scheme by following the adaptive procedure introduced
by Chau in [25] instead. That is, Alice and Bob may switch to a
concatenated Calderbank–Shor–Steane quantum code when the
PEC brings down the QER to about 5%. The strategy of adding
an extra step of quantum error correction toward the end of the
privacy amplification procedure may increase the key genera-
tion rate. To understand why, let us consider the proof of The-
orem 3 together with (34). They tell us that in order to bring the
QER down to less than after rounds of LOCC2 EP, Alice and
Bob have to choose and hence the number of quantum regis-
ters needed in PEC to be for some constant . In con-
trast, by randomizing the quantum registers, the QER after each
application of Steane’s seven quantum register code is reduced
quadratically whenever the QER is less than about 5%. Con-
sequently, Alice and Bob may increase the key generation rate
by performing fewer rounds of LOCC2 EP, choosing ,
and finally adding a few rounds of the Calderbank–Shor–Steane
code quantum error correction procedure.
V. REDUCTION TO THE PM SCHEME
Finally, we apply the standard Shor and Preskill proof [22] to
reduce the EB Scheme A to two provably secure PM schemes
in this section. Let us first write down the detail procedures of
Schemes B and C before showing their security.
PM QKD Scheme B
1) Alice randomly and independently prepares
quantum particles in the standard basis. She randomly
and independently applies a unitary transformation
to each quantum particle, where equals
or an order subgroup of
(if it exists). Alice records the states and transformations
she applied and then sends the states to Bob. Bob ac-
knowledges the receipt of these particles and then applies
a randomly and independently picked to each
received particle. Now, Alice and Bob publicly reveal the
unitary transformations they applied to each particle. A
particle is kept and is said to be in the set if Alice and
Bob have applied and to it, respectively.
Bob measures the particles in in the standard basis
and records the measurement results.
2) Alice and Bob estimate the channel quantum error rate
by sacrificing a few particles. Specifically, they randomly
pick pairs from each of the
sets and publicly reveal the preparation and mea-
sured states for each of them. In this way, they obtain the
estimated channel error rate to within with probability
at least . If the channel error rate is too high, they
abort the scheme and start all over again.
3) Alice and Bob perform the following privacy amplifica-
tion procedure.
a) They apply the privacy amplification procedure with
two-way classical communication similar to the ones
reported in [24], [25]. Specifically, Alice and Bob ran-
domly group their corresponding remaining quantum
particles in pairs. Suppose the th particle of the
th pair was initially prepared in the state . Then,
Alice publicly announces the value GF
for each pair . Similarly, Bob publicly announces the
value where is the measurement result
of the th particle in the th pair. They keep one of their
corresponding registers of the pair only when their
announced values of the corresponding pairs agree.
They repeat the above procedure until there is an
integer such that a single application of step 3b
will bring the signal quantum error rate of the resultant
particles down to for a fixed security parameter
, where is the number of remaining quantum
particles they have. They abort the scheme either when
is greater than the number of remaining quantum
particles they possess or when they have used up all
their quantum particles in this procedure.
b) They apply the majority vote phase error correction
procedure introduced by Gottesman and Lo [24].
Specifically, Alice and Bob randomly divide their cor-
responding resultant particles into sets each containing
particles. They replace each set by the sum of the
values prepared (by Alice) or measured (by Bob) of
the particles in the set. These replaced values are bits
of their final secure key string.
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EQB PM QKD Scheme C
1) Alice and Bob agree on a bijection mapping GF to an
-bit string. Alice prepares sets; and each set con-
tains qubits that are randomly and independently pre-
pared in the standard basis GF identi-
fied through their mutually agreed bijection. She records
the state of each set in the form of an -bit string. Then,
she randomly and independently applies
to each set of qubits, where equals
and for and , respectively. She
permutes the qubits in each set with randomly pre-
pared nonsignaling qubits and sends them to Bob. (In the
upcoming analysis, one finds that for a fixed , the tol-
erable BER of this scheme increases with . However,
the number of nonsignaling qubits used is limited by the
absence of quantum storage capability.) After Bob has re-
ceived these qubits, Alice tells him which of the qubits
belong to a set that will be used to generate the key. Bob
measures and discards the nonsignaling qubits and ap-
plies a randomly and independently picked to
each of the qubits in the set that will be used to generate
the key. Now, Alice and Bob publicly reveal their unitary
transformations applied to each set. A set is kept and is
said to be in if Alice and Bob have applied
and to it, respectively. Bob records the standard
basis measurement results identified through their mutu-
ally agreed on bijection in the form of an -bit string for
each set in . At this point, Alice and Bob should each
have families of -bit strings; each family contains the
prepare state/measurement result of qubits in . More-
over, in the absence of noise and Eve, the corresponding
bit strings in Alice’s and Bob’s hands should agree.
2) Alice and Bob regard their families of -bit strings as
states in the standard basis GF and follow
steps 2 and 3 in Scheme B to obtain their secret key.
Note that in Scheme C (or Scheme C for short if the
values of and are clearly known to the readers), apart from
the possibly entangled qubits that are used to generate the secret
key, Alice and Bob have to create and send random nonsignaling
qubits through the insecure channel. The proofs of Theorems 4
and 5 tell us that while the use of nonsignaling qubits does not
change the tolerable BER, it is essential for Scheme C to tolerate
more drastic eavesdropping attacks.
Theorem 4 (Based on Shor and Preskill [22]) : The tolerable
BER of Scheme A in Section III-B as well as Schemes B and
C above are equal. Thus, the conclusion of Theorem 3 is also
applicable to Schemes B and C.
Proof: Recall from [22] that Alice may measure all her
share of quantum registers right at step 1 in Scheme A without
affecting the security of the scheme. Besides, LOCC2 EP and
PEC procedures in Scheme A simply permute the measurement
basis. Also, the final secret key generation does not make use
of the phase information of the transmitted quantum registers.
Hence, the Shor–Preskill argument in [22] can be applied to
Scheme A, giving us equally secure PM Schemes B and C. (Note
that the introduction of random nonsignaling qubits does not af-
fect the tolerable BER of Scheme C as these qubits are discarded
after being measured and are not used to generate the secret key.)
As discussed in Section IV-A, we cannot compare the
error-tolerant capability of Scheme B that uses unentangled
quantum particles of different dimensions as information car-
riers. Nonetheless, we can compare the error-tolerant capability
of the EQB PM QKD Scheme C against the same eavesdrop-
ping attack.
Theorem 5: For any fixed , the error-tolerant capability of
Scheme C increases with in the limit of a large
Besides, in the limits of a large and a
large , the error-tolerant capability of Scheme C
increases with . That is, for any fixed and in the limit of a
large , whenever Scheme C generates a provably
secure key under an eavesdropping attack, so does Scheme C
under the same attack for any . Furthermore,
there is a family of eavesdropping attacks that can be tolerated
by Scheme C . However, no provably secure key is
produced in Scheme C .
Proof: Recall that Alice sends Bob packets of qubits each
containing signaling as well as nonsignaling qubits and
that any eavesdropping strategy in Scheme C is equivalent to
a classical probabilistic cheating strategy. Suppose that the
channel quantum error rate is . In other words, the probability
that a randomly chosen qubit passing through the insecure
channel is in error equals . Let denote the portion of packets
that contains exactly erroneous qubits. Then, ’s satisfy the
following three constraints:
(41)
(42)
and
(43)
for . Clearly, the set of
satisfying the above three constraints is convex.
Since Eve does not know which qubits are signaling before
Bob has received them, the QER for the signaling qubits is given
by
(44)
We claim that for any ’s satisfying the three constraints
(41)–(43), is upper-bounded by
(45)
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where ’s are the (unique) solutions of the system of equations
(46)
and
(47)
In other words, we claim that among all strategies that cause
a channel quantum error rate , the one that causes either
or erroneous qubits in each
packet produces the highest QER in the signaling qubits.
To show the validity of our claim, we rewrite (44) as
(48)
where if or
and otherwise. Since the set of sat-
isfying (41)-(43) is convex, the claim is valid if we can show
that the last term in (48) is nonpositive for all ’s satisfying
and whenever or .
There are three cases to consider. The first case is that
for all . Clearly, this is possible only if for
all . So in this case, the last term in (48) equals .
The second case is that exactly one . Without loss
of generality, we may assume that the one is . Ob-
serve that one can tune ’s to make the auxiliary real-valued
function in the equation below two times differentiable and
in
if
if
if .
(49)
Consequently, such a is a convex function in the interval
. Since
the convexity of implies that the last term in (48) is nonposi-
tive.
The last case is that exactly two , namely, for
and . In this situation,
demands that there exist for some
and . Consequently,
we may define for and
and decompose as for
all in such a way that
for all and
and
By means of this decomposition and the convexity of the func-
tion , we conclude that the last term in (48) is nonpositive.
Hence, the claim in (45) is valid.
From (45)–(47), it is easy to check that for a fixed , tolerable
BER of Scheme C increases with . Combining with
(39) and Table II, we conclude that for ,
and , . Thus, Scheme C
generates a provably secure key when the channel BER
is slightly higher than 27.64% provided that . Thus,
this scheme is more error resistant than any UQB QKD scheme
known to date.
Note that as , the right-hand side of (45) becomes
. (A simple way to argue why this is the case is to ob-
serve that in the limit of a large number of random nonsignaling
qubits used, Eve can do no better than guessing which of the
qubits in a packet are used to generate the secret key when these
qubits are traveling in the insecure channel.) As the Pauli signal
quantum error is depolarized, Lemma 3 demands that the error
rates caused by this classical probabilistic strategy are given by
if
otherwise. (50)
From (40), the final key is provably secure provided that the
probability satisfies
(51)
Since is a strictly increasing function of , we conclude
that the error-tolerant capability of Scheme C strictly
increases with increasing in the limit of large . Hence, this
theorem is proved.
Since the most error-resistant UQB PM scheme known to date
is the one offered by Chau in [25] (which is also equivalent to
Scheme C ), the above theorem clearly shows the advan-
tage of using entangled qubits as information carriers provided
that Alice and Bob can transmit a large number of qubits without
requiring quantum storage. Specifically, no UQB PM scheme to
date can generate a provably secure key if Eve randomly causes
an error to a qubit in the insecure quantum channel with proba-
bility satisfying .
In contrast, Scheme C tolerates such an attack for any
and for a sufficiently large depending on .
We emphasize that the use of random nonsignaling qubits
is vital in the proof of Theorem 5. Otherwise, Eve may cause
100% signal quantum error in Scheme C by creating
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an error to every one out of consecutive qubits that passes
through the insecure quantum channel. However, we also have
to stress that the presence of nonsignaling qubits lowers the key
generation rate of Scheme C. In the absence of quantum storage,
the number of nonsignaling qubits per packet is limited by
the decoherence time of qubits and the qubit transmission rate
in the channel. The proof of Theorem 5 tells us that for ,
Alice and Bob need to use in order to generate a
provably secure key at a channel BER slightly higher than that
which can be tolerated by all UQB QKD schemes known to
date. Clearly, Scheme C [4], [23] generates a key at a rate 8%
that of Scheme C . Moreover, manipulating a packet of 25
qubits in the absence of quantum storage in Scheme C [4], [23]
is challenging.
Now, we discuss the number of different kinds of states Alice
and Bob have to prepare and measure in Schemes B and C.
Theorem 6: Suppose Alice and Bob follow Schemes B or
C with , so that they prepare and measure in
bases (and hence different states). If
they choose to be an order subgroup of
instead, they need to prepare and measure in different
bases (and hence states).
Proof:
Case 1: . Let be the subgroup
GF
of . Let and .
From (6)–(7)
for all GF , where .
Therefore, if .
In other words, the bases GF
and GF are the same. Con-
sequently, if Alice and Bob choose
in Schemes B and C, they need to prepare and mea-
sure in bases
(and hence, different states).
Case 2: and is the order- subgroup of .
Theorem 8 in the Appendix tells us that is unique.
It is clear that, in this case, Alice and Bob need to
prepare and measure their quantum states in three
different bases.
Case 3: and is the order subgroup
of . Theorem 8 in the Appendix implies
that . Besides, contains an order
subgroup in the form
GF
for some . Recall from Section III-A
that in this case is a
transposed representation. Hence, from (7)
for some GF . Hence, Alice and Bob need
to prepare and measure in
different bases (and hence, states).
Since the maximum number of mutually unbiased bases
equals for any prime power [32]–[34], Scheme B
shows that certain PM QKD schemes not using mutually
unbiased bases can be more error tolerant.
VI. DISCUSSION
In summary, we have introduced two PM QKD schemes
(Schemes B and C) based on depolarization of Pauli errors and
proved their unconditional security. In particular, we showed
that for a sufficiently large Hilbert space dimension of quantum
particles used, Scheme B generates a provably secure key
close to 100% SBMER or 50% BER. This result demon-
strates the advantages of using unentangled higher dimensional
quantum particles as signal carriers as well as depolarizing
Pauli errors in QKD. It also shows that, for , the use of
certain nonmutually unbiased bases increases the error toler-
ance capability of QKD. In addition, Scheme C shows that the
ability to create and transfer, but not to store entangled qubits
is advantageous in quantum cryptography.
There is a tradeoff between the error tolerance rate and key
generation efficiency, however. It is clear from the proof of The-
orem 3 that , and hence, the number of quantum particles
transferred from Alice and Bob, scales as . Besides, the prob-
ability that the measurement results agree and hence the con-
trol quantum register pairs are kept in LOCC2 EP equals
in the worst case. As a result, while Schemes B and C are
highly error tolerant, they generate a secret key with exponen-
tially small efficiency in the worst case scenario. Fortunately, the
adaptive nature of Schemes B and C makes sure that this sce-
nario will not happen when the error rate of the channel is small.
To conclude, in most practical situations, Alice and Bob should
choose the smallest possible whose corresponding
is slightly larger than the channel standard basis measurement
error rate. In this way, they can generate their provably secure
key at the highest possible rate.
APPENDIX
This appendix discusses the possibility of depolarizing Pauli
error using proper subgroups of . The analysis makes
use of the Dickson theorem [35] on the subgroup classification
of projective special linear groups over finite fields. The version
of the Dickson theorem listed below is due to Huppert in [36,
Hauptsatz 8.27].
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Theorem 7 (Dickson): Let . Subgroups of
are isomorphic to one of the following families of groups.
1) elementary Abelian -groups;
2) cyclic groups of order , where is a divisor of
;
3) dihedral groups of order , where is as defined
in 2);
4) alternating group (this can occur only for or
when and );
5) symmetric group (this can occur only if
);
6) alternating group (this can occur only if or
);
7) a semidirect product of an elementary Abelian group of
order with a cyclic group of order , where is a divisor
of ;
8) the group for a divisor of , or the group
for a divisor of .
In addition to the Dickson theorem, the following lemma is
also needed.
Lemma 7: If is odd, is the only element in
whose order is .
Proof: Let
be an order– element in . implies
and . If ,
is consistent with only
if is even. So, must be equal to . Hence,
and . As is odd, is the only order– element in
.
We examine the possibility of using a smaller group to depo-
larize Pauli error in step 1. Specifically, we look for subgroups
of to do the job. Clearly, the order of the subgroup
must be a multiple of .
Theorem 8: Proper subgroups of satis-
fying exist only for and
. Specifically, we note the following.
1) When , . Moreover, this subgroup is
unique and is generated by one element. In fact
2) When , . Moreover, this subgroup is
unique and is generated by two elements. In fact
3) When , . Moreover, is generated
by two elements. One possible choice of is
4) When , . Moreover, is generated
by two elements. One possible choice of is
5) When , . Moreover, is gener-
ated by two elements. One possible choice of is
Furthermore, for all
. Thus, replacing by in Scheme A
also depolarizes Pauli errors.
Proof: From the Dickson theorem, it follows that
does not contain a proper subgroup whose order
divides if . Moreover, if exists
for , . In what follows, we are
going to show that such indeed exist for .
Case 1: When , the Dickson theorem implies that if
exists, . Since the only order– elements
of are
and
the order subgroup of exists and is
unique. An explicit expression for is given
in Table I for reference.
Case 2: When , the Dickson theorem implies that
if exists, .
cannot be Abelian as would then be isomorphic
to , contradicting Lemma 7. Since
is a non-Abelian group of order , is generated
by two elements. By Lemma 7 and [37, proof of
Proposition 6.3], we conclude that the two elements
generating are both of order . Hence, .
Note that the only order– elements of are
and
Therefore, is the only order-
subgroup of . Explicit expressions for
and are given in Table I for ref-
erence.
Case 3: When , the Dickson theorem implies that if
exists, or . Satz 8.13 in [36]
says that . Hence, the only possi-
bility is that . Since can be gener-
ated by two elements, one of order and the other
of order ,
for some provided that
exists. Moreover, and are
of order and , respectively. We may assume that
, for otherwise replace by .
Consequently, the subgroup , if it exists, is equal
CHAU: UNCONDITIONALLY SECURE KEY DISTRIBUTION IN HIGHER DIMENSIONS BY DEPOLARIZATION 1467
to . Thus, can
be generated by two elements in . From
Lemma 7, the order of is equal to . By explicit
search, exists but is not unique. One possible
is
Case 4: When , the Dickson theorem implies
that if exists, . Since is
generated by two elements, namely, and
, the subgroup , if it exists, equals
. Moreover, using the
same argument as in the proof of case 3), we may
choose and . Hence, , if it
exists, is equal to .
By an explicit search, exists but is not unique.
One possible is
Case 5: When , the Dickson theorem implies that
if exists, . Since is generated
by two elements, namely, and , using
the same argument as in the proof of cases 3) and
4), we conclude that , if it exists, can be generated
by two elements. An explicit search tells us that
exists but is not unique, and one possible is
To show that for
all , we observe from our discussion of the
structure of above, that contains an order- proper
subgroup . Since
GF
for some . As all order subgroups of
are conjugate to each other, it suffices to show the
validity for . As , does not contain
elements of the form
or
for some . Therefore, for any
if or
if . (52)
Also, the first column of matrices in are all distinct.
Since , (52) requires that the first columns of the
matrices in are all distinct. Hence,
for all . Combining with the fact
that is a group, Scheme A depolarizes Pauli errors.
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